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Summary findings
Most OECD  countries  have  committed  themselves  to  To encourage  participation,  it is proposed that each
stabilizing  their carbon  emissions  at 1990 levels  by the  non-OECD  country  be allocated  permits  equivalent  to its
year  2000, and some  to reducing  emissions  to 80-90  projccted  baseline  emissions  - and that OECD  countries
percent of 1990 levels  by the years  2005 or 2010.  be allocated  permits  equivalent  to the world  emissions
Most non-OECD  countries  are reluctant  to reduce  target minus  the permit allocations  to the non-OECD
emissions  to combat global  climate  change.  They argue  countries.  Such  a scheme  recognizes  that OECD
that suck policies  would  forestall  their development,  that  countries  have  a higher  willingness  to pay for increasing
the stock of greenhouse  gases  in the air is primarily  from  reductions  and that non-OECD  countries have  a smaller
historical  emissions  from OECD countries  and the  historical  "global  emissions  debt.'
former  Soviet  Union,  and that those countries  should be  Under  that proposed regime,  Larsen  and Shah find chat
made to bear the cost of such abatement  policies.  the cost of emissions  reductions  for OECD  countries
Larsen  and Shah  evaluate  alternative  permit allocations  would  be about 50 percenr  lower than unilateral
for a global  tradeable  permit regime  designed  to  reductions  would  be, and that non-OECD  countries
minimize  the costs of stabilizing  world carbon en-issions  would  also realize  substantial  net gains from participating
from fossil  fuel combustion  at 1987 levels  by the year  in such a global  treaty.
2000.  Moreover,  that global  treaty would  be 68 percent less
They  find that an important cross-section  of countries  cosrly  worldwide  than would realizing  the same  target
would  have little incentive  to participate  in a treaty based  through unilateral  reductions  by the OECD  countries.
on such  widely  discussed  forms  of permit allocations  as
permit allocations  by GDP, by population,  or by some
combination  of the two.
This  paper  - a produca  of the Public  Economics  Division,  Policy  Research  Department  - is part of a larger  effort in the
department  to examine  economic  policy  instruments  for global  environmental  protection.  The study  was funded  by the
BAnk's  Research  Support  Budget  under  the research  project  "World  Energy  Subsidies"  (RPO  677-28).  Copies  of this  paper
are available  free from the World Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington  DC 20433. Please  contact  Carlina  Jones,  room
N10-063, extension  37754 (21 pages).  June 1994.
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1. Introduction
This paper examines the feasibility  of alternative tradeablc permits regimes to stabilize global
carbon dioxide emissions at their 1987  level by the year 2000.'  An optimal policy response to global
climate change would be a cooperative agreement in which each country reduces emissions until the
marginal costs of reductions for each country are equal to the sum of marginal benefits of reductions
across all  countries (Hoel  1990,  1991a,b).  However, reliable estimates of  marginal benefits of
greenhouse  gas reductions  are simply not available, and therefore, one can only strive for cost efficiency
in meeting emissions targets.  Some countries may consider  the costs of greenhouse gas reductions to
exceed potential benefits and therefore may not be willing to participate in a treaty unless suitably
compensated. Furthermore, a treaty must also address the flee rider problem.
Most OECD countries have committed  to stabilize  their carbon emissions  at 1990 levels by year
2000, and some to reduce emissions to 80-90% of 1990 levels by year 2005 or 2010.  However, most
non-OECD countries are reluctant  to reduce enmssions  to combat global climate change arguing instead
that such policies would forestall their development and tha  the stock of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere is prmarly  due to historical  emissions from OECD countries and the former Soviet Union
and it is they who should be made to bear the costs of such abatement policies.
This paper evaluates alternative permit allocations for a global tradeabte permit regime that
mimizes  costs of stabilizing  world carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion  at 1987 levels by the
year 2000. Particular attention is paid to the issue  of inducing  broad participation  in a treaty. Alternative
'According to Nordhaus (1991a). carbon dioxide emissions are responsible  fbr about 80% of global wanning potntial
associated  with the accumulation  of all greenhouse  gases in the atmosphere.permit allocations are evaluated in terms of costs or benefits of participating  in a global permit system
as well as efficiency  gains of inducing  broader participation. The paper is organized  as follows. Section
2 is concerned with current and projected carbon emissions.  Section 3 details marginal cost functions
and determination  of equilibrium  pennit prices.  Section  4 evaluates  the costs and benefits of alternative
permit allocations  and incentives  to participate  inan intemational  treaty. A final sectionsummarizes  main
conclusions.
2. Currea  and Projected Carbon Emissions
The sample countries were selected on the basis of their share of world emissions, per capita
emissions, and/or their emissions per dollar of GDP in order to have a diverse representation.  Nine
lower income, five  middle income,  four emerging  market economies,  and all twenty-four  OECD)  countries
are included (see Table 1)2. The sample countries accounted  for almost 90% of world carbon emissions
from fossi! ftiel  Unibustion  in 1987.  The shares of world emissions from the OECD countries and the
non-OECD sample  countries  were about  46% and 43 % respectively. The remaining  non-OECD  countries
are aggregated and presented as the "rest of world".  The share of world emissions is as high as 10%
for China, 18% for the former Soviet republics (12% for Russia), and 22% for the United States.  Per
capita emissions vary from 30 kg in Bangladesh  to 593-0  kg in Luxembourg.  Emissions per dollar of
GDP vary from 0.06 kg in Switzerland  to 2.06 in North Korea.
Projections of carbon emissions  to the year 2000 for the same sample counties are presented in
Table 2.  Total world carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion  are projected to be 36% higher in
year 2000 relative to the 1987 emission  level.  This implies  an average annual  growth rate of 2.4%.  The
share of world carbon emissions  for the OECD countries  are relatively unchanged  -from  1987. However,
China's share of world carbon emissions  are projected  to increase from 10% to 14V%.  Emissions shares
2Some  of these countries  no longer exist, i.e. the Soviet  Union, Yugoslavia  and Czechosic*P-kia.
2Table 1.  Carbon Emissions and  GDP Daa For Selected  Countries  - 1987
GDP per  Carbon  Perent  of  Carbon  Cubon
capita  emissions  world  emissions  enissions
(US S)  (00C  tons)  enilssions  to GDP  per capita
(kg/USS)  (kg/cap)
BANGLADESH  166  3155  0.06%  3.18  30
NIGERIA  229  8962  0.16%  0.37  84
CHINA  *  286  569900  10.38%  1.87  533
INDIA  322  145400  2.65%  0.57  182
PAJISTAN  325  13154  0.24%  0.39  128
INDONESIA  443  26258  0.48%  0.35  153
ZIMBABWE  598  4160  0.08%  0.77  463
EGYPT  709  19037  0.35%  0.54  380
NORTH KOREA  889  39203  0.71%  2.06  1834
MEXCO  1715  77200  1.41%  0.55  943
BRAZIL  2145  50300  0.92%  0.17  356
SOUTH  AFRICA  2493  75900  1.38%  0.92  2292
VENEZUELA  2629  23307  0.42%  0.49  1276
SOUTH KOREA  3121  44900  0.82%  0.34  1067
POIAIND  1700  125700  2.29%  1.96  3338
YUGOSLAVIA  2700  32339  0.60%  C.52  1403
USSR  2900  1012900  18.45%  1.23  3578
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  24W  64000  1.17%  1.71  4110
SWIZERLAND  26115  10330  0.19%  0.06  1580
ICELAND  21873  4S1  0.01%  0.09  M9S5
NORWAY  19963  8580  0.16%  0.10  2D48
DENMARK  19830  16610  0.30%  0.16  3238
SWEDEN  19257  15150  0.28%  0.09  1812
GERMANY  16754  26670D  4.86%  0.20  3427
FINLAND  18070  14420  0.26%  0.16  2925
LUXEMBOURG  16331  2200  0.04%  0.36  5930
FRANCE  15913  91000  1.66%  0.10  1636
AUSTRIA  IS441  13000  0.24%  0.11  1717
THE NETHERLANDS  14521  35600  0.65%  0.17  2428
BELGIUM  14457  26000  0.47%  0.18  2637
ITALY  13176  97000  1.77%  0.13  1691
UNITED KINGDOM  12024  154000  2.80%  0.23  2707
IRELAND  S353  7540  0.14%  0.25  2120
SPAIN  7452  43600  0.79%  0.15  1123
GREECE  4619  14370  0.26%  0.31  1437
PORTUGAL  3612  7700  0.14%  0.21  758
TURKEY  1293  34150  0.62%  0.50  649
JAPAN  19437  237100  4.32%  0.10  1942
UNITE  STATES  18434  1246100  22.69%  028  5112
CANADA  16056  109100  1.99%  0.26  4221
AUSTRALIA  11364  63900  1.16%  0.35  3932
NEW ZEALAND  10749  S700  0.10%  0.16  1709
OECD  2520331  45.90%  0.20  3015
Rest of World  634394  1.1.55%  0.55  639
World  54910W  100.00%  0.34  1112
Sources: World Resource Instite;  Wodd Bank.
3Table 2.  Projecdons  of Carbon Emnission  for Selected  Countres - Year 2000
Carbon  Percent  of  Carbon  Carbon
emissions  world  emissions  emissions
(000 tws)  emissions  per capita  to GDP
(kg/cap)  (kgIUS$)
BANGLADESH  8078  0.11%  58  0.29
NIGERIA  13161  0.17%  82  0.44
CHINA  1074631  14.28%  839  1.46
INDIA  291640  3.88%  294  0.60
PAKISTAN  24804  0.33%  161  0.39
INDONESIA  41066  0.55%  195  0.29
ZIMBABWE  5048  0.07%  397  0.66
EGYPT  40605  0.54%  642  0.61
NORTH KOREA  44617  0.59%  1614  2.06
MEXICO  113371  1.51%  109o  0.55
BRAZIL  89141  1.18%  506  0.18
SOUTH AFRICA  104629  1.39%  2351  0.98
VENEZUELA  30150  0.40%  1244  0.52
SOUTH KOREA  90059  1.20%  1905  0.28
POLAND  125700  1.67%  3210  1.73
YUGOSLAVIA  32839  0.44%  1298  0.46
USSR  1012900  13.46%  3441  1.08
CZECHOSLI;VAKIA  64000  0.85%  3953  1.50
SW_rZERLAND  13363  0.18%  1866  0.05
ICELAND  622  0.01%  2401  0.08
NORWAY  11099  0.15%  2515  0.09
DENMARK  214B7  0.29%  4081  0.14
SWEDEN  19598  0.26%  2169  0.08
GERMLANY  345005  4.59%  4376  0318
FINLAND  18654  0.25%  3639  0.14
LUXEMBOURG  2846  0.04%  7474  0.32
FRANCE  117718  1.56%  2009  0.09
AUSTRIA  16817  0.22%  2109  0.10
THE  NETHERLANDS  46052  0.61%  2832  0.15
BELGIUM  33634  0.45%  3324  0.16
ITALY  125480  1.67%  2159  0.11
UNIT  KINGDOM  199215  2.65%  3412  0.20
IRELAND  9754  0.13%  2638  0.22
SPAIN  56401  0-75%  1434  0.13
GREECE  18589  0.25%  1835  0.27
PORTUGAL  9961  0.13%  968  0.18
TURKEY  44177  0.59%  657  0.44
JAPAN  306714  4.08%  2416  0.09
UNITE  STATES  1611963  21.43%  5886  0.24
CANADA  141132  1I8-%  4922  0.23
AUSTRALIA  82661  1.10%  4301  0.30
NEW ZEALAND  7374  0.10%  1993  0.14
ToM!  OECD  3260317  43.34%  3611  0.17
ROW  1056313  14.04%  823  0.55
Wodd  7523069  100.00%  1254  0.31
ScuTe:  Model Caluations.
4in most of the other low and middle income  countries  are also projected  to increase  significantly. Former
Soviet republics' share is projected to decline from 18% to 13% as a result of economic  restructuring.
Emissions  shares are also projected  to decline  in the eastern european  countries. Carbon emissions per
capita are projected to increase from 1112 kg to  1254 for the world as a whole, while emissions per
dollar of GDP are projected  to decline  from 0.34 to 0.31 as a result  of increased  efficiency  in energy use.
3. Marginal Cost Functions and Equilibrium Permit Price
The purpose of a tradeable  emissions  permit regime is to limit aggregate  emissions  to a targeted
level.  We consider the year 2000 to which carbon emissions are projected as a baseline scenario of
business as usual.  The equilibrium  permit price in year 2000 is determined  by the aggregate  permit level
(world emissions in 1987) and the marginal cost function of emission reductions in each country3. At
the present  time, country  specific  marginal  cost finctions .re not available  for most non-OECD  countries.
Even  for OECD  countries  estimated  cost functions  are mostly  based on different  models  and assumptions.
We have therefore chosen to apply  the following  marginal  cost fimction  (assuming  zero intercept)  derived
by Nordhaus (199la,b) based on a survey of cost studies in OECD countries,
R =  1- e.4ulomc  (1)
where R is percentage emissions  reductions and MC is marginal costs of reductions (US$Iton) 4. It is
plausible that costs of reductions are lower in countries that have done very little to improve energy
efficiency- In particular, there may be net economic  gains from initial  carbon  reductions  in countries  with
significant fossil fuel subsidies (Churchill and Saunders 1991, Larsen 1993, Larsen and Shah 1994,
Larsen and Shah 1992a,b, Shah and L2rsen 1992a) such as the former Soviet Union, China and
3See  Kosobud  et at (1991),  Quinn  et al (1992)  and Soulh  et al (1991)  for a discussion  and estimates  of welfare  gains  of initial
allocations  of multiperiod  undated  permits to allow intcrtemporal  efficiency.
'The studies  upon which  this margial cost function  is based ignore  possible  benefits  of local pollution  reductions  associated
with reductions  in carbon intensive  energies such as fossil  fuels. For further discussion  and empirical  evidence  see Gbmsrod
et al (1992), Shah and Larsen (1992a,b)  and Summers  (1991).
5Venezuela. We assume that all countries by year 2000 would have reached the point at which marginal
costs are non-negative, and therefore, marginal costs of reductions are zero for the first unit of carbon
emission. Each country is assumed to reduce emissions until the marginal costs of reductions are equal
to the emission permit price'.  The equilibrium  permit price, given the cost function in (1), that clears
the permit market and thus limits total world emissions  to the 1987 level is estimated to equal US $58
per ton of carbon and is independent  of any permit allocation.
4. Costs of Alternative Permit Allocations
An important  aspect of alternative  permit allocation  schemes is the international  support they may
expect to receive.  It is reasonable  to assume  that a treaty will be signed primarily  by nations that expect
positive net benefits from participation. In view of the scientific  uncertainty, at present, it is extremely
difficult to incorporate  benefits  from greenhouse  gas emission  reductions  in terms of damages averted by
delaying the threshold of global warming. Thus the approach taken in this paper is to assume that some
countries have a positive willingness  to pay for emissions reductions  while other countries have small or
zero willingness  to pay.  Permit allocations must then be such that the countries with negligible or zero
willingness to pay  are induced to  participate in a  treaty.  Furthermore, countries with a positive
willingness  to pay must also gain from such an allocation  compared to the case wit  emissions reductions
exclusively in  the latter countries 6. In particular, it is assumed that OECD countries have positive
willingness  to pay for emission  reductions, while non-OECDs  have negligible  or zero willingness  to pay.
Each country  will reduce emissions  unfil  marginal  costs of reductions  are equal to the permit price
of US $58 per ton of carbon. If the number of emissions  permits is less (greater) than baseline emissions
minus reductions, the country will purchase (sell) permits for US $58 per ton of carbon. The net costs
5For cost efficient national policy responses, see Pearce (1991)  and Poterba (1991).
'Bohm (1992)  considers  tde impact  on negotiated  allocations  in the case of no permit trade versus  the case of allowing  permit
trade.  Odier effects of unilateral reductions  such as increased  emissions  in counties not participating  in a treaty due to shif5s
in the marginal  benefit curve (Hoe[ 1991b)  or changes  in comparative  advantage  are also ignored.
6or benefits in US dollars of alternative permit allocations, with linear approximation  of the marginal cost
function over the relevant range, are given by,
CJ =  P [EJ'  - (Ej - AR)]  - 0.5PAER  (2)
where P'  is the permit price, EJP  is the allocated permit volume, EJ is the baseline 2000 emissions, and
Ej'  is emissions reductions in country j.  The first term is the costs (-) or revenues (+)  from pennit
purchases or  sales,  and the second term is the cost of emissions reductions with EJ  given by  (1)
multiplied by baseline 2000 emissions. Thus given the permit price, baseline emissions and cost function,
the net costs or benefits are determined by the permit allocation scheme.
The permit allocations considered are:  (i) by population; (ii) by GDP; (iii) by a combination of
population and GDP; (iv) to each non-OECD country equivalent  to its projected baseline emissions and
to OECD countries as a group equivalent to the world emissions target minus non-OECD permits; and
(v) unilateral reductions by the OECD countries.
Permit allocation by population:
The permit allocation by population is calculated for the year 2000 by,
vJ  = Er ( POPj I POR. )  (3)
where Ejl is emissions permits allocated to country j  (units of thousand tons), El is world permit level
(EP = Ej EJ'), POPj is the projected population of country  j, and POP,, is the projected  world population.
El is in this case equivalent to 1987 world emissions.  Permit allocation per capita is the same in all
countries and is given by ErIPOPW  =  0.915 tons of carbon.
Permit allocations  relative to projected baseline emissions in the year 2000 are presented in Table
3.  The ratio is greater than one, i.e.,  allocations are larger than projected emissions, for all the low-
income sample countries expect for North Korea.  The ratio is less than one for all the middle-income,
emerging market economies and OECD countries, except for Brazil and Turkey.  OECD countries as a
group would only receive permits equivalent  to 25% of their projected emissionLs.
7From (2) and (3) the net costs or benefits relative to GDP are given by,
Cj/GDPj = P  l/gdpj  [EPIPOP.  - (1 - 0.5R)E/POP 1]
where gdpj is per capita GDP for country  j.  Given the permit allocation per capita and (1), we bhve,
Cj/GDPj = r  l/gdpj  [0.915 - 0.865E 1 /P0PJ 1 (4)
From (4), we observe that the break-even point is 1.058 tons of carbon baseline emissions per capita.
The net benefits (net costs) are decreasing (increasing) in per capita baseline emissions and decreasing
(decreasing) in per capita GDP.  The net benefits and costs of this allocation in the year 2000 are
presented in Table 4.  Brazil, Portugal,  Turkey  and all the low-income  sample countries, except for North
Korea, would benefit from this permit allocation scheme. In particular, the net benefits for Bangladesh
and Nigeria would be more than 25% of GDP in year 2000, and more than 11  % for Pakistan. From (4)
and Table 2 we see that this is because  of the low per capita baseline emissions and the low per capita
GDP.  The net costs would be as large as more than 5% of GDP :or Poland and Czechoslovakia  as a
result of high per capita baseline emissions and relatively low per capita GDP.  The net costs to the
013OCD  as a group would be more than 0.6 % of GDP.  The net costs are high for OEC0D  countries such
as Luxembourg, Australia, the United States  and Canada  because their baseline  per capita emissions are
significantly  higher than in most other OECD countries.
Given the net costs involved for most of  the middle-income countries and particularly the
emerging market economies, these countries are unlikely to participate in a global treaty based on a
permit allocation by population. The sample countries in these groups are projected to contribute more
than 20% of world emissions in the year 2000, and therefore participationby these groups is Vital  for an
8Table  3. Rauc  of  Permt  AIlomiGon  o Carbon  Emllon  (Yar 2000)
Allocation  Allocauon  Non-ORCD
by  bvy  fally  covent
population  ODP
BANGLADESH  15.75  0.77  1.0]
NIOBRIA  11.17  0.51  1.00
CHINA  1.09  0.15  1.00
INDIA  3.12  0.37  1.00
PAKISTAN  5.70  0.7  1.00
INDONESIA  4.70  0.78  1.00
ZIMBABWE  2.30  0.34  1.00
EGYPT  1.43  0.37  1.00
NORTH KOREA  0.57  0.11  1.00
MEXICO  0.83  0.41  1.00
BRAZIL  1.81  1.27  1.00
SOUTH  AFRICA  0.39  0.23  1.00
VENEZUELA  0.74  0.43  1.00
SOUTH  KOREA  0.48  0.79  1.00
POLAND  0.29  0.13  1.00
YUGOSLAVIA  0.71  0.49  1.00
USSR  0.27  0.21  1.00
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  0.23  0.15  1.00
SWITZERLAND  0.49  4.22  0.38
ICELAND  0.38  2.85  0.38
NORWAY  0.36  2.49  0.38
DENMARK  0.22  1.56  0.38
SWEDEN  0,42  2.71  0.38
GERMANY  0.21  i.25  0.38
FINLAND  0.25  1.58  0.38
LUXEMBOURG  0.12  0.70  0.38
FRANCE  0.46  2.48  0.38
AUSTRIA  OA3  2.29  0.38
THE NETHERLANDS  0.32  1.52  0.38
BELGIUM  0.28  1.40  0.38
ITALY  0.42  1.99  0.38
UNTED KINGDOM  0.27  1.13  0.38
IRELA  0.35  1.00  0.38
SPAIN  0.64  1.69  0.38
GREECE  0.50  0.82  0.38
PORTUGAL  0.95  1.22  0.38
TURKEY  1.39  0.51  0.38
JAPAN  0.38  2.55  0.38
UNITED STATES  0.16  0.92  0.38
CANADA  0.19  0.97  0.38
AUSTRALIA  0.21  0.74  0.38
NEW ZEALAND  0.46  1.60  0.38
Total OECD  0.25  1.28  0.38
ROW  1.11  0.41  1.00
World  0.73  0.73  0.73
Note::
a:  Non-OECD  couniesare  allocated  emissionsperritsequivalentto project  baseline  emissions. OECDcountries
as a group are allocated  permits  equivalent  to the targeted  world emissions  less permits  allocated  to non-OECD
countries. Each OECD country receives  pcrmits  in propordon to their projected  baseline  emissions.
Source: Authors' calculations.
9Table 4.  Net Costs (-) or Benefits  t+l  as a Percentage  of GDP
of nitenwadve  Permit Alocadons (Year 2000).
Allocadon  Allocation  Non-OECD  OECD
by population  by GDP  fully covered  unilatemi
reductions
BANGLADESH  25.38%  -0.16%  0.23%
NIGERIA  26.63%  -0.93%  0.35%
CHINA  1.92%  -6.06%  1.15%
INDIA  7.92%  -1.73%  0.47%
PAKISTAN  11.11%  -0.68%  0.31%
INDONESIA  6A1%  -0.14%  0.23%
ZIMBABWE  5.58%  -2.04%  0.52%
EGYPT  1.98%  -1.75%  0.48%
NORTH KOREA  -3.58%  -9.10%  1.62%
MEXCO  J.10%  -1.46%  0.43%
BRAZIL  0.97%  0.42%  0.14%
SOUTH  AFRICA  -2.72%  -3.63%  0.77%
VENEZUELA  -0.39%  -1.30%  0A41X
SOUTH KORFA  -0.64%  4.13%  0.22%
POLAND  -5.83%  -7.39%  1.36%
YUGOSLAVIA  -0.42%  -0.99%  0.36.%
USSR  -3.79%  4.16%  0.85%
CZECHOSLOVAIaA  -5.56%  -6.28%  1.18%
SWIT2JUMAND,  -0.12%  1.04%  -0.15%  -0.30%
ICELAND  -0.22%  0.91%  -0.22%  -0.44%
NORWAY  -0.26%  0.85%  -0.26%  -0.51%
DENMARK  -0-54%  0.58%  -0.41%  -0.81%
SWEDEN  -0.21%  0.89%  4.24%  -0.47%
GERMNY  -0.69%  0.40%  .0.51%  -1.02%
FiNLAND  -0.51%  0-59%  -OAI%  -0.80%
LUXEMBOURG  -1.38%  -0.30%  -0.91%  -1.81%
FRANCE  -0.22%  0.85%  -0.26%  -0.51%
AUSTRIA  -0.25%  0.82%  -028%  -0.55%
THE NEITERLANDS  -0.47%  0.57%  -0.42%  -0.83%
BELGIUM  -0.55%  0.50%  -OA6%  -0.91%
rrALY  -0.29%  0.74%  -0.32%  -0.64%
UNITED KINGDOM  -0.69%  0.31%  *0.56%  -1.12%
IRELAND  -0.68%  0.18%  -0.64%  -1.26%
SPAIN  -0.18%  0.64%  -0.38%  -0.75%
GREECE  -0.58%  -0.07%  -0.78%  -1.55%
PORTUGAL  0.09%  0.38%  -0.53%  -1.04%
TURKEY  1.36%  -0.92%  -1.26%  -2.50%
JAPAN  -0.25%  0.87%  4.25%S  4.50%
UNITED STATES  -1.01%  0.08%  -0.70%  -1.38%
CANADA  4.92%  0.14%  -0.66%  -1.31%
AUSTRALIA  -1.16%  -0.23%  -0.87%  -1.72%
NEW ZEALAND  -0.33%  0.60%  -0.40%  -0.79%
Total OECD  -0.62%  0.43%  -0.50%  -0.9%
ROW  0.80%  -1.47%  0.43%
Wodd  -024%  -0.24%  4.24%
Source: Author's calculatios.
10efficient  global treaty.  Furthermore, several large OECD countries may also be reluctant  to participate
given that they experience  net costs of about 1% of GDP.
Permit allocation by GDP
The permit allocation  by GDP is calculated  for the year 2000 by using the following  expression,
EjP=Ep  ( GDPjI  / C-DP, )  (5)
where GDPj is country j's  GDP in millions of US dollars, GDPW  is aggregate world GDP in the same
units in year 2000, and EP is equivalent  to 1987 world emissions. Permit allocation  per dollar of GDP
is given by E/(GDPW  = 0.23 kg of carbon.
Permit allocation relative to projected baseline emissions  in the year 2000 are presented in Table
3.  The ratio is less than one for all the low-income  sample countries in contrast to the case of permit
allocation by population.  It  is also less tha  one for the middle-income  (except for Brazil) and the
emerging market economies  as in the case of allocation  by population. Thus, the high income countries
of the OECD end up with more pennits than the baseline emissions, except for Luxembourg,  Australia,
the Unted  States and Canada, and the relatively lower income OECD countries such as Greece and
Turkey.
From (1), (2), (5) and permit allocation  per dollar of GDP, we have,
CiGDPJ  =  P' [0.23 - 0.865E/GDPj]  (6)
From (6) we see that the break-even point is 0.26 kg of carbon baseline emissions  per dollar of GDP,
and the net benefits (net costs) are decreasing (increasing)  m baseline emissions  per dollar of GDP.  The
net benefits of this allocation  in the year 2000 are presented  in Table 4.  All the OECD  countries, except
for Turkey, Luxembourg,  Australia and Greece,  would benefit  under this permit allocation. Even though
the United States and Canada would receive less pernits than their baseline emissions, they would sfill
benefit from this allocation  beouse  their baseline emissions  per dollar of GDP are less than 0.26 kg (see
Table 2).  All the low-income, middle-income countries (except Brazil) and the emerging market
11economies would  have net costs from this allocation. In particular, the net costs would be large for North
Korea, China, Poland, Czechoslovakia  and USSR because of their high baseline emissions per dollar of
GDP.
Given the estimated high net costs, most non-OECD countries are unlikely to participate in a
global treaty based on a permiit  allocation by GDP.  Non-OECD countries as a group are projected to
contnrbute  more than 56% of world carbon emissions in the year 2000 and therefore represent a group
whose participation is vital for an efficient global treaty.  Thus a permit allocation  by GDP appears even
less likely to induce broad participation than an allocation by population.  Furthermore, negotiations
regarding an allocation by GDP will also have to resolve the problematic issue of determining the level
of a common currency GDP.
A Dermit allocation by a combination  of  orpulat!on  and GDP:
A permit allocation that is based on a combination  of population and GDP is unlikely to induce
any broader participation than an allocation  by population because the middle-income  countries and the
emerging market economies will end up with net costs under both allocations  and therefore under any
allocation that is also a combination  of the two (Table 4).
A nermit allocation that fully covers non-OECD projected emissions:
An altemative allocation, given that allocations by population or GDP are unlikely to induce
participation  from all important  groups, is identified:  non-OECD  countries  are allocated emissions  permits
equivalent to projected baseline emissions in year 2000,
Epk = Ek  (7)
for each country k of the non-OECDs. The OECD countries as a group are allocated permits equal to
the targeted world emiissions  minus permit allocations  to the non-OECDs,
EPOE=  E-  EPO  (8)
12The permits to the OECDs as a group can be distributed to each OECD country by several allocation
schemes. We have arbitrarily chosen that each OECD country is allocated permits in proportion to their
projected baseline emissions,
Al _  Es  EOECD  / EOECD(9)
where A 1 is baseline emissions for country 1 and  EOECD is total OECD baseline emissions 7. Permit
allocations relative to projected baseline carbon emissions for the year 2000 are presented in Table 3.
The ratio is equal to one for all the non-OECD  countries, and 0.38 for all the OECD countries.
From (1), (2) and (7), we have that the net benefits relative to GDP for the non-OECD countries
are,
CkIGDPk  =  0.135PIGDPk  (10)
and from (1), (2) and (9), that net costs relative to GDP for the OECD countries are,
Cl/GDP, =  -0.485P'E/GDPI  (11)
These net benefits and costs for the year 2000 are presented in Table 4. They are increasing in baseline
emissions  per dollar of GDP.  Thus net benefits relative to GDP are highest (more than one % of GDP)
for North Korea, Poland, Czechoslovakia  and China, and the net costs are highest (more than 0.85% of
GDP) for Turkey, Luxembourg, Australia and Greece.  The average costs to the OECD countries are
estimated  at 0.50% of GDP.
All the non-OECD countries would benefit from this allocation, 8 and are therefore far more.
likely to  participate in  a global treaty under this permit  allocation compared to  the allocations by
population, GDP or some combination  of the two.
7An interesting  alternative  allocation is one in which permits are allocated so as to equlize cost  relative to GDP for each
OECD county.  Given relatively  large differences  in per capia income,  and perhaps  marginal  cost functions, this can give rise
to a very different permit allocation than an allocation  that is proportional  to projected  emissions  (see Bohm and Lrsen  1994).
$See  Bohm and Larsen (1994) for an allocation  under which non-ECD  countries  (eastern  european  countries  and states of
the fonner Soviet  Union in their  case) receive  permits  so as to cover the costs of emissions  reductions,  i.e., without  net benefits.
13Unilateral reductions  by the OECD countries:
As an alternative to allocations  that potentially  could induce participation  from the non-OECD
countries, the OECD countries  could  unilaterally  reduce  emissions  as to stabilize world emissions at 1987
levels. In this case the same quantity  of permits would  be allocated  to the OECDs as under the allocation
in which the projected emissions of the non-OECDs are fully covered, and we assume that permits to
each of the OECD countries continue  to be allocated in proportion to their baseline projected  emissions.
However, the OECDs can now only trade permits among themselves, and not with the non-OECDs. In
this case the equilibrium  permit price is estimated  at US $181 per ton of carbon as compared to US $58
if all countries participate. The costs relative to GDP for the year 2000 are presented in Table 4.  The
costs are on average 0.99% of GDP, or almost twice as high as under the allocation in which the
projected emissions of the non-OECDs are fully covered.  The cost efficiency gains to the world as a
whole is about 68%, which is significantly  higher than the cost reductions  to the OECD countries under
the permit allocation in which the non-OECDs receive  permits equivalent  to their projected emissions.
This is because a proportion of efficiency  gains accrue to the non-OECD  countries.
A  _comarison of costs and benefits of altemaive permit allocations:
We have evaluated five alternative permit allocations in terms of their costs and benefits to
participating countries and their likely merits to induce broad participation from OECD and non-OECD
countries. An allocation  by GDP is rather unlikely  to induce  participation  from the non-OECD  countries
given the high net costs involved, although this allocation would result in net benefits to most of the
OECD countries.  An allocation by population would be less costly for the OECD countries than
unilateral reductions.  However, most of the niddle  income and emerging market economies would
unlikely participate if permits are allocated relative to population.  We observed that the allocation in
which the projected  baseline emissions  were fully covered  for the non-OECDs  would  involve less avenge
net costs for the OECDs than if permits were allocated by population, or OECDs were to undertake
14unilateral  reductions. The non-OECD  countries  would  realize  net benefits  from this allocation. This
leads  us to conclude  that  the  allocation  in which  non-OECDs  are fully  covered  in terms  of their  projected
baseline  emissions  could  be attractive  to both OECD  and non-OECD  countries. However,  a potential
problem  with the latter  allocait,n  scheme  is that net benefits  relative  to GDP  for no-OECDs would  be
larger  for non-OECDs  with  higher  emissions  per dollar  of GDP,  such  as China,  North  Korea  and  Poland
and  therefore,  countries  that  have  achieved  higher  energy  or carbon  emission  efficiency  at their  own  cost
prior to an international  treaty  would  not be rewarded.  One  may  argue that this consideration  is not
important  for non-OECD  countries  because  those  that  have  achieved  higher  eergy  or carbon  emission
efficiency  have done so on national  interest  grounds. OECDs  with higher energy  efficiency  would
nevertheless  be rewarded. For instance,  the costs  relative  to GDP  would  for the United  States  be more
than twice as high as for France  if the marginal  cost function  in  (1) is reasonably  correct for both
countries. However,  if marginal  costs are lower in OECDs  with relatively  low carbon or energy
efficiency,  the cost  difference  between  low  and  high  carbon  efficiency  OECD  countries  would  be less  than
in Table  4.
The allocation  scheme  in which non-OECDs  are fully covered  is noteworthy  as developing
coutries are not  forced  to reduce  emissions  that  may  slow  their  development  efforts  and  OECD  countries
do not assume  an unrealistic  cost  burden  of emissions  reductions.  An additional  merit  of this  allocation
scheme  is that it recognizes  that OECDs  had the advantage  of unresticted emissions  during  their own
development  path, while  non-OECDs  are far from having  used their "quota". Smith  (1991)  developed
a "natural  debt index" to illustrate  this point by examining  data on accumulated  historical  emissions.
Furthermore,  an international  treaty  on greenhouse  gas emissions  reductions  need  be such  that  countries
have  an incentive  to participate. A simple,  but  useful,  perspective  may  be to have  an allocation  scheme
at relatively  low cost  to OECDs  but that  allows  large  enough  transfers  to induce  participation  frm  non-
OECD  countries. The allocation  scheme  presented  here, in which  projected  emissions  of non-OECD
countries  are fully  covered,  may  satisfy  such a condition.
15The free rider problem:
An optimal  policy response to global warming would be a cooperative  agreement in which each
country reduces emissions until the marginal costs of reductions for each country are equal to the sum
of marginal benefits of reductions  across all countries.  In this case the marginal costs of reductions for
any given country are generally  larger than the marginal  benefits to that country alone.  Thus the country
is generally better off by not participating in the treaty, i.e. by being a free rider, if a similar treaty is
established among the remaining  countries.
The free rider problem is therefore an issue as regards the permit allocations  evaluated in this
paper.  We have estimated the costs and benefits of participating  in a global treaty based on marginal
costs of em;issions  reductions and permit allocations, ignoring benefits (or possibly costs for some
countries) of greenhouse gas reductions in terms of climate changes.  In this case, countries for which
partcipation involves net costs after emissions reductions and permit trade, would in general be better
off by not participating. However, countries for which participation  involves  net benefits  would be worse
off by not participating. In fact these countries  would have zero benefits if they do not participate.
The permit allocation, of the ones we have evaluated, that we found most likely to induce the
broadest participation, and at significantly  lower costs for the OECDs tban unilateral reductions, was the
one in which each non-OECD country is allocated permits equivalent  to its projected baseline emissions
and the OECDs are allocated  permits equivalent  to the targeted world emissions  minus permits to the non-
OECDs.  Under this permit allocation all the non-OECD  countries would be worse off if they do not
participate in the treaty.  However, the free rider problem would remain among the OECD countries
because  their participation  would involve net costs.  In particular, this could be a problem among dLe  less
richer OECD countries.  These countries may have to receive a larger volume of permiits  in order to
ensure their participation.
16Variations in mareinal cost functions:
A  final consideration is possible deviations from the assumption of uniform marginal cost
functions.  We will consider one special case: suppose that the OECD countries still have the same
marginal cost functions  as (1), but that the non-OECD  countries have lower marginal costs of emissions
reductions than the OECD countries because, on average, OECDs have already exploited  the lower cost
options of improving their energy efficiency and reduce reliance on fossil fuels.  With lower marginal
costs in non-OECDs the equilibrium  permit price will be lower, given the same world emissions target
and baseline emissions.  Emissions reductions  would then partially shift from OECDs to non-OECDs
where costs are lower.  Thus the total cost to the OECDs of achieving the world emission  target will be
lower.  This implies that the costs to the OECDs, as presented in Table 4, actually are overstated if the
marginal costs in the OECDs are no higher and the marginal costs in the non-OECDs are lower.  This
is illustrated in Figure -1 with a linear approximation of the marginal cost function in  (1).  For the
equilibrium  permit price P,  and marginal cost functions  MC' and MCk  for the OECDs and-non-OECDs
respectively, the total costs to the OECDs are the area ABDE.  In case the marginal costs in the non-
OECDs are lower, say MC, the costs reductions  for the OECDs are the area CDFG.
Lower marginal  costs in the nonOECD counties would also impact  on their net benefits  or costs.
Under the allocation in which the non-OECDs receive permits equivalent  to their projected emissions,
and their marginal cost functions are given by MCk, their net benefits are the area BDF.  If margina
costs are lower, say MC, the net benefits are BCG.  This area could be larger or smaller than BDF,
depending  on the decline in permit price relative  to the increase in carbon reductions  in the non-OECDs.
In fact, net benefits will increase if the elasticity  of the MCI curve (OECD)  is elastic.  The elasticity of
the curve in Figure 1, i.e. equation (1) as estimated by Nordhaus (1991a), is inelastic in the relevant
range, and thus net benefits to the non-OECDs would be lower than presented in Table 4 if marginal
costs of emissions reductions for the non-OECDs  are lower than assumed.
17Costs/Benefits  of  Emissions  Reductions  and  Permit  Trade
Figure  1
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This paper has evaluated altemative tradeable pernit  allocations in a global permit regime for
stabilization  of world emissions at 1987 levels by the year 2000.  An allocation by population is likely
to be unacceptable to most middle income countries as well as to the emerging market economies of
eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union because of the large net costs involved.  An allocation by
CDP will most likely be unacceptable  to almost all non-OECD  countries because they would end up
bearing a large proportion of the costs of emissions reductions. Furthermore, an allocation based on a
combination of population and GDP is unlikely to induce participation from most middle income and
emerging market economies because of the net costs involved  under allocations by both population  and
GDP.
An alternative allocation  scheme entails that non-OECD  countries are allocated permits equal to
their projected emissions, and that OECD countries are allocated permits equal to the world emissions
target minus the permit allocations  to the non-OECD  countries. Such a scheme  may be able to generate
sufficient support for a  viable international agreement on greenhouse gas emission reductions as it
represents a reasonable allocation scheme given that the OECDs have a higher willingness to pay for
eiission  reductions, and the fict that non-OECDs  are only responsible  for a significantly  lesser part of
the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.  Under this permit allocation, non-OECD countries
would benefit from participation,  and the net costs to the OECD countries would be only one-half  of the
costs of unilateral OECD reductions.  The cost savings would be even larger if marginal costs of
reductions in the non-OECD  countries are lower than in the OECD countries.
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